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A shift in warfare has taken place at an increasing rate since 2004, a shift that is more toward irregular warfare than conventional and employed by non-state actors.
This shift toward irregular warfare is not entirely abandoning the concept of conventional warfare but rather a hybrid form of the two. Hybrid warfare demands changes to the way the United States modernizes its air forces at a critical time in light of fiscal constraints. Reduced defense spending will force a change to the way the United Warfare are leading examples. Foremost among those aspects is the national deficit and the measures taken to reduce that deficit. In order to thoroughly examine truly effective ways of combating the deficit issue without decimating America's ability to defend herself and her allies, one must look at how wars are fought. The concept of modern warfare and how it moves within an Irregular -Conventional Warfare continuum must be considered with the understanding that future threats will drive decisions with regard to modernizing. The notion that state versus state war is a thing of the past and that state versus non-state conflict is the future has merit but may be oversimplified.
The means by which America's air forces support the fight must be updated to keep pace with evolving enemies and a dramatically constrained fiscal environment. This paper will provide ideas on how to modernize the fighter fleet by providing some warfare theory, current cost facts, and background on the current modernization plan.
Modern Warfare
General Rupert Smith, a forty year veteran of the British Army and student of history uses Clausewitz to convey his theory on the evolution of warfare. In his book A successful force needs to be aware of the shift and adapt to it. This affects the utility of force on the modern battlefield, which has also changed as a result of modern warfare. "It is my experience in both national and international operations that without all three elements of the trinity -state, military and the people -it is not possible to conduct a successful military operation, especially not over time."
1 Strategy has been depicted as the center link in a three link chain where it is intertwined with policy and tactics, with interaction between the three as both necessary and constant. 2 Similarly, "the commander at each level is also necessarily dependent on the actions and decisions of those above and below him in the hierarchy." 3 General Smith's thoughts on command, rooted in Clausewitz theory can be found clearly in U.S. military doctrine documents and seem to follow a parallel pattern with regard to the view of strategy as the center link in a three link chain. It is the commander after all who will execute the strategy and endorse the tactics that will ultimately win, or lose the state policy objectives.
Just as strategy is rooted in state policy, the commander executing that strategy through tactics is affected by commanders up and down the chain of command. Smith's studies convey Clausewitz' theories but also show that today's enemy is not one of a sovereign state engaging in industrial war, but rather an enemy with no state affiliation. Therefore, while Clausewitz' theories still apply, warfare in the modern world has shifted and with it there needs to be a shift in engaging an enemy. Clausewitz said "force, to counter opposing force equips itself with the invention of art and science." 4 America is at the point where it is absolutely necessary to equip its military with "the invention of art and science." 5 Some of that art should come in the form of thinking differently about how to best organize, train and equip in a way that defends America's interests as well as those of current and future partner nations. The following pages will focus on the U.S. air forces' fighter aircraft fleet and examine risks with potential modernization options. In so doing, feasibility, acceptability, and sustainability considerations will be assessed if not inherently obvious.
Background to the Current Modernization Plan
The fleet which is the fourth generation of fighter aircraft, now referred to as The JSF program is plagued by delays, increased costs and restructuring efforts.
It has also been scrutinized in light of F-22 Raptor issues such as corrosion concerns and may likely be further scrutinized as the F-22 continues to experience growing pains. and OA-X aircraft efficiently fielded across the Total Force and Partner Nations. This plan would be more in line with reduced defense spending, provide "safety nets"
currently missing beneath the bridge to JSF, provide a cost effective means of fighting the state versus non-state conflict, and provide a new aircraft (OA-X) that is both appealing to, and affordable for emerging partner nations. The Air Force alone has estimated fighter type aircraft shortfalls that range from 200 -800 aircraft. 9 However, since those estimates were made, JSF development and production has been hampered by delays and cost overruns, F-22 procurement numbers have been reduced, a new National Security Strategy has been developed, and concerns over future adversary threats have changed. In short, the thought process for an all stealth fighter force to defend against high end threats and anti access environments is not in line with the more current theory of modern warfare. battlefields. This is a shift away from the state versus state warfare history has known.
Additionally these non-industrial conflicts are increasing in frequency and are likely to continue. The significance of this phenomenon is evidenced in the Quadrennial Defense Review's (QDR) emphasis on rebalancing the force to ensure success today while preparing for a complex, uncertain tomorrow.
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The U.S. Air Force has adapted to support these types of operations but has done so using the same equipment it has used to deter, or when necessary, fight state versus state wars. There are costs associated with this approach and those costs are $15,879 per flight hour, which equates to more than ten times the operating cost of a turboprop driven OA-X which costs approximately $1,500 per flight hour. 16 Using the same cost comparison for maintenance as used in examining fuel costs, the OA-X model again illustrates the reduced spending effort (Figures 3 & 4) . The total OA-X operating cost savings exceed $2.1 billion per year ( Figure 5 ). More importantly, it could come to fruition more quickly than the JSF and at roughly 60% of the cost. Our ability to advance constructive cooperation is essential to the security and prosperity of specific regions, and to facilitating global cooperation on issues ranging from violent extremism and nuclear proliferation, to climate change, and global economic instability -issues that challenge all nations, but that no one nation alone can meet... Successful engagement will depend upon the effective use and integration of different elements of American power. 
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